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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by Margret Aikhionbare from the judgment and
conviction of Assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-102 (1997). This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this Class B

Misdemeanor conviction, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953
& Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Issues

1.

Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the

City's use of rebuttal to twice present its case-in-chief. A corollary issue is
whether the trial court committed plain error in allowing the evidence, even
though counsel failed to object.
2.

Whether

the

evidence was insufficient

to

support

Aikhionbare's conviction.
B.

Standards of Appellate Review

1.

The ineffectiveness claim presents a question of law and is

reviewed non-deferentially for correction of error. See State v. Classon, 935
P.2d 524, 531, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 30-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
2.

(a)

Sufficiency of the evidence issue requires Aikhionbare

to marshal the facts to demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient even
-2-

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Pilling, 875
P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
(b)

The plain error analysis requires this Court to view the

trial record as a whole to determine if the claimed errors seriously affected the
fairness of the trial. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State
v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 & nn.7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110
S. Ct. 62 (1989).
(c)

A trial court's factual findings in a bench trial is

reviewed for clear error. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah
1988).
C.

Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review

The issue relating to failure to object to rebuttal witnesses was not
preserved in the court below, as trial counsel could not have preserved his own
ineffectiveness for appellate review. See State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, review
-3-

is proper here, for Aikhionbare is being represented by new counsel and the
trial record is adequate on the ineffectiveness claim.1
In the alternative, this Court could apply the plain error doctrine
to counsel's failure to preserve the foregoing issue. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d);
Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-12; State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules cited
below, are reproduced in the following order at Addendum II:
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102; Salt Lake City Code § 11-08020; Utah Rules of Evidence 103(d), 611.
x

See State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 8 n.19 (Utah 1993); State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah
Ct. App.), reversed and remanded on other grds., 906 P.2d 890 (Utah 1995). See
generally State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)("ineffectiveness
of trial counsel should be raised on appeal if the trial record is adequate. . . and
the defendant is represented by other than trial counsel."); State v. Strain, 885
P.2d 810, 814 & n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(same).
-4-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A»

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the judgment and conviction of Margret
Aikhionbare ("Margret" or "Aikhionbare")

on April 22, 1997, by the

Honorable Robin W. Reese, judge presiding, in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, Division II, State of Utah. The court convicted
Aikhionbare of "Battery," or more appropriately, Willful Use of Unlawful
Force or Violence Against the Person of Another, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-020 (1996).

See Utah Code

Annotated § 76-5-102 (1953 & Supp. 1996). See also R.l.
B*

Course of Proceedings

Aikhionbare waived jury and was tried by the court on March 26
and April 22, 1997. She was subsequently convicted as charged (R.193).
C.

Disposition in Trial Court

On April 22, 1997, the court ordered Aikhionbare committed to
the Salt Lake County Jail for sixty days and fined her in the amount of four

-5-

hundred dollars. The jail sentence was suspended in lieu of a one-year
probation (R.19; Addendum I). This appeal then followed.
D.

Statement of the Facts

In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence reveals the
following:2
1.

The Fight

On September 30,1996, appellant Margret and her husband, Victor
("the Aikhionbares"), went over to the apartment of their friend, Evelyn
"Okhomina" (R.35).3 Prior to the Aikhionbares' arrival at the apartment,
Evelyn testified she overheard a telephone conversation in which her
paramour, Don Okhomina, tell Victor not to come over (R.36-37). Don then
hung up, relating to Evelyn that that was Victor he had just told not to come
2

See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-96(Utah 1994)(requiring that appellate
court review verdict evidence in the lightmost favorable to the trial court's
dtermination). However, Aikhionbare will present conflicting evidence "to the
extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal." Classon, 935 P.2d at 531,
312UARat27.
3

The Okhomina's apartment is located at 717 South 200 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah (R.36). Don Okhomina, as later revealed, is legally married to a
woman other than Evelyn (R.61-62).
-6-

over (R.36-38).

About fifteen minutes thereafter, the door bell rang, and

apparently the Okhominas' children opened the door for the Aikhionbares
(R.38). Upon seeing the Aikhionbares inside the apartment, Evelyn went into
the kitchen (R.40). At this point, Evelyn heard Margret yelling loudly and
angrily, referring to Evelyn as a liar (R.40-42).4 Margret then came into the
kitchen, grabbed a cooking pot and threw it against the wall (R.42).
At this point, Evelyn told the Aikhionbares to leave the apartment
(R.45-46). Rather than leave, Margret grabbed Evelyn's blouse, while Don
tried to separate the two (R.46-48). Don then threatened to call the police.
While being pinned against the wall by Margret, Evelyn broke loose, reached
for the telephone, but had it knocked off her hands (49-50).

Thereafter,

Evelyn ran out of the apartment and attempted to call the police at a nearby
"7-11" store (R.50). The Aikhionbares subsequently came out of the apartment
and stood by their vehicle (R.52). As Evelyn passed by them on her way back
from the store, Margret followed Evelyn and forced her way into Evelyn's
4

Evelyn later came to understand that Margret was referring to the time
when Evelyn had taken her children and left Don. Don had allegedly accused the
Aikhionbares of encouraging Evelyn to leave (R.44).
-7-

apartment (R.54). A fight ensued, in which Margret allegedly bit Evelyn on
the lips, causing her mouth to bleed (R.54-55).
2.

The Trial

At the conclusion of Evelyn's testimony, the City reserved the right
to call rebuttal witnesses, and then rested (R.69). Margret thereafter testified,
relating that she and her husband had been invited over to the Okhominas'
apartment to discuss an issue relating to a domestic fight between Don and
Evelyn (R.70-72,85). When they arrived, Margret was confronted by Evelyn,
who pointed a spoon at her and said "don't let me use this spoon to hit you
[and] put pepper in your eye." (R.73,90). Thereafter, Victor told his wife they
needed to leave if Evelyn does not want to discuss the issue (R.74). At this
point, the Aikhionbares left the apartment, and Evelyn followed them to their
vehicle. As Margret returned to the apartment to retrieve her purse, Evelyn
slapped her and tore buttons off her shirt (R.75-78). Evelyn ended up
dragging Margret into the apartment, and then began chewing on her fingers.
It was at this point that Margret chewed on Evelyn's mouth to get her hand
released (R.79-80).
-8-

Victor Aikhionbare also testified for the defense. He said Don had
called him to discuss an issue concerning an association in which both were
members. Victor then suggested that they meet to resolve some other personal
issues, and Don agreed (R.104). Consistent with Margret's testimony, Victor
said they had left the apartment when his wife remembered her purse. As she
was about to enter the apartment, Evelyn grabbed Margret's shirt, tore it open,
and started biting her fingers (R. 105-109).
At this point, the City called Don as a rebuttal witness, without any
defense objection (R.130). Don testified that Victor is his childhood friend.
He had called Victor to discuss a matter relating to the association, and Victor
said he wanted to come over to discuss other issues. Don told Victor not to
come to the apartment because it was too late (R. 133-134). Victor and his
wife nonetheless came over and began yelling in profanities (R.137).
Thereafter, Margret threw the cooking pot against the kitchen wall, and the
fight ensued as Evelyn testified (R.142-147).5
5

The City also called as a "rebuttal" witness Salt Lake City Police Officer
Richard Blanchard, who basically testified to what the parties told him upon
arriving at the scene (R.166).
-9-

The court thereafter found Aikhionbare guilty as charged (R.193),
and sentenced her to sixty days in jail, in addition to four hundred and fifty
dollars in fine. The jail sentence, however, was suspended, in lieu of a one-year
probation. See R.19. This appeal then followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the City's use of
rebuttal witnesses to twice present its case-in-chief. The manner in which the
City presented its evidence deprived Aikhionbare a fair trial, for the City had
the opportunity to evaluate Aikhionbare's evidence, regroup, and then represent its case to the court. Aikhionbare was prejudiced by counsel's
performance, because the case was rather close and the manner in which the
City presented its case unfairly tipped the balance in its favor.
The trial court should have noticed counsel's error in not objecting
to the manner in which the City presented its case.

It should have been

obvious to the court, with relation to plain error, that counsel's failure to object
to the evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.

-10-

The evidence clearly was insufficient to convict Aikhionbare, given
that the evidence shows that the alleged victim was indeed the perpetrator of
the assault, and that Aikhionbare acted in self-defense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AIKHIONBARE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE CITY'S USE OF
REBUTTAL WITNESSES TO TWICE PRESENT ITS
CASE-IN-CHIEF.
A.

Relevant Facts

At the conclusion of the testimony of its main witness, the City
rested its case, reserving the right to call rebuttal witnesses. See R.69. After
the defense rested, the City announced its rebuttal witnesses. See R.130.
Defense counsel raised no objection. See id. The rebuttal witnesses then
testified consistently with the prosecutrix. See R. 130-147, 164-170.
B.

Standard of Review

To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a defendant must show that (i) counsel's
performance was deficient in some demonstrable
manner so as to fall below an objective standard of
-11-

reasonable
reasonable
assistance,
been more

professional judgment, and (ii) there is a
probability that but for the ineffective
the result in the proceeding would have
favorable to the defendant.

State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553,555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).6 Whether the district
court properly allowed rebuttal testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See State v. Goodlijfe, 578 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah 1978). Accord United
States v. Vivero, 413 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1017, 90 S.Ct.
583 (1970).
C.

Counsel's Performance and Prejudice to Aikhionbare

It is axiomatic that the district court retains reasonable authority
"over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses. . . . "

Utah R. Evid.

611(a). That authority, however, is not boundless. See Goodlijfe, 578 P.2d at
1290-91. The court is empowered to exercise that authority "reasonably." Utah
R. Evid. 611(a). In Goodlijfe, the State presented its sexual abuse case against
the defendant and rested. After the defendant presented his witnesses, and
'See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984); State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995); Templin, 805 P.2d at
186; Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 312 UAR at 31; State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543,
545 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
-12-

over his objection, the State presented the testimony of additional witnesses in
rebuttal. See Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1289-90. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the supreme court held that "the obvious and logical time" for the
State to present testimony corroborating the prosecutrix "is during one's case
in chief." Id. at 1290-91. A leading evidentiary treatise is in accord:
Plaintiff's rebuttal and defendant's surrebuttal. The
plaintiff... is entitled to present his case in rebuttal.
The plaintiff/government may not at this stage present
witnesses who merely lend support to the evidence
originally presented as to the elements of the offense. . .,
but is confined to testimony directed to refuting the
defendant's evidence. The proper scope and function
of rebuttal is thus refutation, which involves evidence
which denies, explains, qualifies, disproves, repels or
otherwise sheds light on evidence offered by the
defense including evidence rehabilitating the credibility
of witnesses.
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 611.3, at 515 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis
added).
Here, as in Goodliffe, the City's rebuttal witnesses did not refute
the testimony of Aikhionbare's witnesses. Rather, the rebuttal witnesses'
testimony was cumulative, merely lending support to the prosecutrix' assertion.
See R.130-147, 164-170. See also Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1290-91. In other
words, Evelyn's testimony arguably was directed at establishing the elements
-13-

of the charged crime. Accordingly, Don's corroborating testimony should
obviously have been presented at the City's case in chief, not in rebuttal. See
Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1290.
In our adversary system, it is the responsibility of defense counsel
to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence against his client.7 Here,
counsel failed to object to the admission of the prejudicial, "rebuttal"
testimony. Under the Strickland standard, counsel's performance was clearly
deficient.8 See State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990); State v. Hallett,
796 P.2d 701, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (counsel's performance deficient in
failing to object to admission of hearsay evidence), ajfd., 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah
1993).9 Aikhionbare, however, is aware of this Court's long-held presumption
n

See Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 103.9 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1996) ("Graham"); Weinstein et al., Evidence 96 (8th ed. 1988); Imwinkelried,
Evidentiary Foundations 7, 10 (1986).
8

The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for determining the
responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d
540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA Standard Relating to Defense Function
provides that a lawyer should follow proper procedures, entering appropriate
motions and objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, "The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986).
9

But see State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoted case
omitted) ('"Decisions as to what objections to make ... are generally left to the
professional judgment of counsel'"); State v. Julian, 111 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989)
(same).
-14-

that counsel's conduct might be considered sound trial strategy even if
counsel's action is patently unwise.10
In Julian, the defendant contended that his counsel failed to file a
motion in limine and to object to presentation of evidence of other wrongful
conduct on the part of the defendant. However, after reviewing the record, the
supreme court concluded that:
counsel made a conscious decision to allow
introduction of the testimony in question in order to
demonstrate the theory that defendant's wife had
abnormal reactions to and preoccupation with sexual
matters, which explained a poor marital relationship,
and led to manipulate and corrupt the children and
cause the fabrication of their testimony. While
counsel conceivably took a risk by allowing discussion
of defendant's relationship with his wife, including
their "sexual problems," defendant cannot now
complain that the defense was ineffective because it
was unsuccessful.
Julian, 111 P.2d at 1064 (footnote omitted).11

10

See, e.g. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
("[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions.").
xl

See also State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. App.) (counsel's
strategy of eliciting from defendant his prior convictions did not render counsel's
performance deficient or defendant prejudiced), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah
1989).
-15-

The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable from Julian and
its progeny. Here, Aikhionbare maintained her innocence throughout the
investigatory stages and at trial. She also denied ever assaulting Evelyn, which
testimony was contradicted by Don. Thus, credibility before the trier of fact
was of paramount concern because of the conflicting testimony.12 Accordingly,
there was no trial strategy upon which counsel's failure to preclude the
admission of the so-called rebuttal testimony could be predicated. See Emmett,
839 P.2d at 786.
The rebuttal testimony was unnecessary and not probative of any
element of the charged crime. Therefore, admission of such evidence was
clearly prejudicial to Aikhionbare,13 since it made her

appear to be a

prevaricator, and thus more inclined to commit the alleged offense. The court
could have reached a different verdict absent the highly prejudicial evidence
and counsel's ineffectiveness in precluding its admission.14

Consequently,

12

See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992); State v. Deporto,
935 P.2d 484, 494 (Utah 1997).
12

See State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).

™See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; cf. Deporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at
24 (result might have been different absent admission of inadmissible other bad
acts).
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Aikhionbare urges this Court to reverse her conviction and order a new trial.15
POINT II
THE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE THE PLAIN
ERROR IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE
DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHICH FAILURE AFFECTED
AIKHIONBARES RIGHT.
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) states:
Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.
"Plain error" requires that the error be obvious to the trial court and that the
error affect the substantial rights of the accused.16 It should have been obvious
to the trial court that the so-called rebuttal witnesses were providing merely
cumulative evidence, which was prejudicial and inadmissible.
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), is instructive. In
Emmett, the defendant was charged with sodomy upon his five-year-old son.
On direct examination, the defendant admitted having committed a forgery in

ls

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122
(Utah 1989) (if the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is sufficient, "it is
irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict").
166

Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; State v. Elm, 808
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
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which the victim was his sister. In his closing argument, the prosecutor alluded
to the forgery conviction, stating that the defendant had taken advantage of his
sister and has now taken advantage of his son. The defendant's counsel,
however, failed to make a timely objection to the comment. See 839 P.2d at
785. In addition, there was conflicting testimony between the defendant and
his wife on critical issues. Accordingly, credibility became very important. See
id. The defendant eventually was convicted, apparently because the jury
believed he did not testify truthfully. See id. at 786.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, noting first that evidence
of a prior conviction is inadmissible under Rules 404 and 609 as substantive
evidence of guilt. That defense counsel failed to object to the comment, the
court continued, should not have precluded the trial court from noticing this
obviously plain error. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86. The court noticed that,
because the case was rather close due to the circumstantial nature of the
State's evidence, the substantive use of the prior conviction must have tilted the
balance in favor of conviction, "particularly... where [the defendant's character
is at the heart of his defense." Id. at 786. Accordingly, the court ordered a
new trial. See id. at 787.

-18-

As previously stated, the trial court should not have allowed the City to
twice present its case-in-chief, even though counsel raised no objection.
Credibility was an important factor at trial, and the admission of the evidence
tilted the balance unfavorably against Aikhionbare. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at
786.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT AIKHIONBARE OF ASSAULTING
EVELYN.
A.

Standard of Review

The district court's determination is reviewed for clear error. To
establish error that requires a reversal, an appellant must marshall all the
evidence supporting the challenged findings and then show that despite that
evidence, the trier's findings are clearly lacking in support, even when viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Pilling, 875 P.2d at 607-608; In
re Interest ofD.W., Ill, 856 P.2d 363, 367 (Utah 1993). See generally Pena, 869
P.2d at 936.

- 19-

B.

Aikhionbare was convicted on less than sufficient evidence

The facts which support the district court's decision are generally
as follows: Aikhionbare went uninvited to Evelyn's apartment. While there she
began yelling loudly and angrily, referring to Evelyn as a liar. She went into
the kitchen, grabbed a cooking pot and threw against the wall. Evelyn told
Aikhionbare to leave the apartment. A fight ensued thereafter, in which
Aikhionbare allegedly bit Evelyn on the lips, causing her mouth to bleed.
In contrast, several facts weighed in favor of Aikhionbare: she and
her husband had been invited over Evelyn's and Don's apartment to discuss an
issue relating to a domestic fight between Don and Evelyn. When they arrived,
Aikhionbare was confronted by Evelyn, who pointed a spoon at her and said
"don't let me use this spoon to hit you [and] put pepper in your eye." At this
point, the Aikhionbares left the apartment, and Evelyn followed them to their
vehicle. As Aikhionbare returned to the apartment to retrieve her purse,
Evelyn slapped her and tore off buttons off her shirt. Evelyn ended up
dragging Aikhionbare into the apartment and began chewing on her fingers.
It was at this point that Aikhionbare in defense chewed on Evelyn's mouth to
get her hand released.
-20-

Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
guilty verdict, the evidence the City presented clearly was insufficient to
support the verdict. The evidence points to Evelyn as the aggressor, and
Aikhionbare acting in self defense.

Therefore, her conviction should be

reversed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the evidence was insufficient, Aikhionbare's conviction
should be reversed, with an order to the district court mandating dismisal of
the charge. In the alternative, counsel's failure to competently represent
Aikhionbare's interest, as discussed above, was prejudicial, and thus requires
that Aikhionbare be given a new trial. As an alternative ground, it was plain
error for the trial court not to have noticed counsel's error. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse the decision of the trial court on the ineffectiveness claim,
and remand the case for a new trial.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel certify that this matter can be disposed of on the parties'
briefs.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November,

1997.
YENGICH RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
HAKEEM ISHOLA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this

day of

November, 1997, to Henry Sisneros, Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451
South 200 East, #125, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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ADDENDUM II
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Art. IV, § 4
AMENDMENT I

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT VUI
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessiv
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain right
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are rese
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial po<
The judicial power of the United States shall not!
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, comma
prosecuted against one of the United States by Cito
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
AMENDMENT XII

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, as
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whi
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same stall
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the persofl
AMENDMENT V
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro- Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of i
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted
cess of law and just compensation clauses.]
1
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,whk
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to thel
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, the Government of the United States, directed to the!
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall,!
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,^
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be the certificates and the votes shall then be county
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, person having the greatest number of votes for Pw
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process shall be the President, if such number be a majority!
of law; nor shall private property be taken'for public use, whole number of Electors appointed; and if no perai
such majority, then from the persons having the Ifi
without just compensation.
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those votetfi
President, the House of Representatives shall choose ii
AMENDMENT VI
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Prej
the votes shall' be taken by states, the representatiai
[Rights of accused.]
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpo*
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the consist of a member or members from two-thirds of thel
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to ii
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit- And if the House of Representatives shall not d*
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by President whenever the right of choice shall devohij
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the them, before the fourth day of March next following, t&J
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to Vice-President shall act as President, as in the easel
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, death or other constitutional disability of the President
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Pre|
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority^
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person!;
AMENDMENT VII
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the a
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum j
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole nui
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be Senators, and a majority of the whole number I
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ii
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the office of President shall be eligible to that i
President of the United States.
to the rules of the common law.

Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish*
ments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden ance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,*
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue'
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, pa
describing the place to be searched, and the person or'1
v
be seized.
*
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press —
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the f
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if'
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous'
and was published with good motives, and for justifi
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
to determine the law and the fact.
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excepti
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except ur
absconding debtors.
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voti
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations
prescribed by law.
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im
contracts,]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law imp
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in 1
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving *'
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act s
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil po
The military shall be in strict subordination to
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be q"
any house without the consent of the owner; nor inx
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have
convicted, shall exist within this State.
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged
use without j ust compensation.
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]>
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
privilege or immunity.
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
or deny others retained by the people.
Sec* 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibi
The provisions of this Constitution are ma
prohibitory, unless by express words they are d~
otherwise.

CRIMINAL CODE

76-5-101
Section
76-5-410.
76-5-411.

Child victim of sexual abuse as competent
witness.
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child
victim of sexual abuse.
Parts

HIV Testing • • Sexual Offenders and Victims
76-5-501.
76-5-502.
76-5-503.
76-5-504.

Definitions.
Mandatory testing — Liability for costs.
Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs
paid by Crime Victim Reparations.
Victim notification and counseling.
PARTI

ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
76-5-101. "Prisoner" denned.
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
1994
76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c)' an act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes
substantial bodily injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused
caused serious bodily injury to another.
1996
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees.
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or
private school, with knowledge that the individual is an
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer.
1992

76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer.
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge
that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
1987
76-5-102.5. Assault b y prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1974
76-5-102.6. Assault o n a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1994
76-5-102.7.

Assault against health care provider a n d
basic life support worker — Penalty.
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or basic
life support worker is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person knew that the victim was a health care
provider or basic life support worker; and

201

(b) the health care provider or basic life support worker
was performing emergency or life saving duties within tin
scope of his authority at the time of the assault.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Basic life support worker" has the same meaninj
as "basic life support personnel" provided in Section
26-8-2.
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provide!
in Section 78-14-3.
iff
76-5-103. A g g r a v a t e d assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commit*
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation^!
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined is
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felonji
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
iff

76-5-103.5. A g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t b y prisoner.
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital felooj
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated assault
is guilty of:
(a) a felony of the second degree if no serious
injury was intentionally caused; or
j
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily injury;
was intentionally caused.
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony on
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault ii
guilty of:
"
%:
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury'
was intentionally caused; or
t\
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inteih^
tionally caused.
-'•"
(3) For the purpose of this section, "serving a sentence*]
means sentenced and committed to the custody of the Depart-^
ment of Corrections, the sentence has not been terminated orj
voided, and the prisoner is:
< '&
(a) not on parole; or
(b) in custody after arrest for a parole violation,
76-5-104.

Consensual altercation n o defense to homi*]
cide o r assault if dangerous w e a p o n used c
participants are engaged i n a n ultimate fightj
ing match.
v i|
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 c
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that!
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, orj
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel,!
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined la]
Section 76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged ioj
an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9-705.
76-5-105. Mayhem.
[(1)1 Every person who unlawfully and intentionally d£]
prives a human being of a member of his body, or disables orj
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puti]
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem,!
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
lWJ
76-5-106. H a r a s s m e n t .
-fj
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to!
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written orj
recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
h*m
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
if"

4

11.08.060

Definitions - Crime of
stalking - designated.

11.08.010 Assault.
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury
on the person of another. It is unlawful for any
person to commit an assault within the limits of
Salt Lake City. (Prior code 5 32-1-2)
11.08.020 Battery.
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of
force or violence upon the person of another. It is
unlawful for any person to commit a battery
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3)

11.08.030 Telephone Harassment.
A» A o^tsow is guilty of teleotioAie.
harassment if, with intent to annoy or alarm
another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful
communication, including but not limited to
making a call or calls and then terminating the call
before conversation ensues; or
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls
at extremely inconvenient hours; or
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use
of telephone communication in a manner likely to
provoke a violent or disorderly response; or
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes
any false statement concerning injury, death,
disfigurement, indecent conduct or criminal
conduct of the person telephoned or any member
of his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or
threatening language with intent to terrify,
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a false
statement as herein set out shall be prima facie
evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, harass or
annoy.
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B
misdemeanor. (Ord. 88-86 $ 60 (part), 1986: prior
code § 32-1-19)
11.08.040 Emergency Telephone Abuse.
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone
abuse if such person:

1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender
the use of a party line or a public pay telephone to
another person upon being informed that such
telephone is needed to report a fire or summon
police, medical or other aid in case of emergency,
unless such telephone is likewise being used for
an emergency call; or
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line
or a public pay telephone on the pretext that an
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency
exists.
B. Emergency telephone abuse \s a Class B
misdemeanor.
C. For the purposes of subsection A of this
section:
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which
property or human life is in jeopardy and the
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the
observation of human life or property;
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main
telephone stations connected therewith, each
station with a distinctive ring or telephone
number. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code
{32-1-20)
11.08.050
Place Of Commission Of Offense
Involving Use Of Telephone.
Any offense committed by use of a telephone
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or
their successors, may be deemed to have been
committed at either the place at which the
telephone call or calls were made, or at the place
where the telephone call or calls were received.
(Ord. 88-86 $ 60 (part), 1986: prior code §
32-1-22)
I f.08.060
Definitions - Crime Of Stalking Designated.
A.
Definitions.
I.
"Course of conduct" means a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose but serving no legitimate
purpose.
a.
The course of conduct must cause a
reasonable person to suffer severe emotional
distress.

I

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ARTICLE VIII OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
RULE

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

701.! Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
702. Testimony by experts.
703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.
706. Court-appointed experts.

ope.
rpose and construction,

ihngs on evidence,
eliminary questions,
nited admissibility,

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY.

mainder of or related writings or recorded statements.
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

dicial notice of adjudicative facts.

II

ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS.

Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings.
^Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceed-

I
t+

ingS

*

ARTICLE LX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION.

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.

y.
L Definition of "relevant evidence."
I Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evig dence inadmissible.
L Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
|
confusion, or waste of time.
I Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
* exceptions; other crimes.
b Methods of proving character.
I Habit; routine practice.
, Subsequent remedial measures.
L Compromise and offers to compromise.
I Payment of medical and similar expenses.
I Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, a n d related
statements.
, Liability insurance.
, Admissibility of alleged victim's sexual behavior o r alleged sexual predisposition.
i
}f

801. Definitions.
802. Hearsay rule.
803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
805. Hearsay within hearsay.
806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.

ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES.

Privileges recognized.
Husband-wife.
Communications to clergy.
Lawyer-client.
Government informer.
Physician and mental health therapist-patient.
Miscellaneous matters.
Environmental self-evaluation privilege.
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES.

General rule of competency.
Lack of personal knowledge.
Oath or affirmation.
Interpreters.
Competency of judge as witness.
Competency of juror a s witness.
Who may impeach.
Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
Religious beliefs or opinions.
Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
Writing used to refresh memory.
Prior statements of witnesses.
Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court.
Exclusion of witnesses.

901. Requirement of authentication or identification.
902. Self-authentication.
903. Subscribing witness* testimony unnecessary.
ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS,
RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS.

1001.
1002.
1003*
1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.

Definitions.
Requirement of original.
Admissibility of duplicates.
Admissibility of other evidence of contents.
Public records.
Summaries.
Testimony or written admission of party.
Functions of court and jury.
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES.

1101. Applicability of rules.
1102. [Reserved.l
1103. Title.
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
R u l e 101. S c o p e .
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to
the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.
R u l e 102. P u r p o s e a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n .
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, a n d
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end t h a t t h e t r u t h m a y be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.
R u l e 103. R u l i n g s o n e v i d e n c e .
(a) Effect o f e r r o n e o u s ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case t h e ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record, stating t h e specific ground of objection, if t h e
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer o f proof. I n case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known
to t h e court by offer or was apparent from t h e context
within which questions were asked.
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(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of the
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made,
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Rule 104. Preliminary questions.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of
the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an
accused is a witness and so requests.
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to crossexamination as to other issues in the case.
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant
to weight or credibility.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or f recorded statements.
>
<
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of
adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.

(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is
timely request to an opportunity to be h'
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor'
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, t
be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice
any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or'
court shall instruct the jury to accept as cond^
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the co
the jury that it may, but is not required to, zr
any fact judicially noticed.
X
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTION
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil
proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceeding!
provided for by statute or by these rules,'*
imposes on the party against whom it is directed
proving that the nonexistence of the presu
probable than its existence.
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presu
consistent, the presumption applies that is*"
weightier considerations of policy. If considei
are of equal weight neither presumption app1'
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law
and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of^
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim
to which federal law supplies the rule of d::
mined in accordance with federal law.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evide"Relevant evidence" means evidence having
make the existence of any fact that is of or
determination of the action more probable <
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally
relevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except*
provided by the Constitution of the United*
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, orbgr
by other rules applicable in courts of this
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence
prejudice, confusion, or waste of
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
value is substantially outweighed by the «
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading'
considerations of undue delay, waste of time;
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not adn
conduct; exceptions; other c '
(a) Character evidence generally. Evid"
character or a trait of character is not
purpose of proving action in conformity the;
ticular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence
trait of character offered by an accused,
ecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a"
of character of the victim of the crime
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut

